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Chapter 1: Union Certification Success under
Voting versus Card-Check Procedures
The first chapter of the dissertation examines the
impact of mandatory election laws on union certification
success using data on private sector certification attempts
from British Columbia over the 1978-1998 period. The
paper exploits a unique natural experiment. Prior to 1984,
British Columbia had the traditional Canadian cardcheck system, where the union can be certified without
an election if they sign up a sufficient proportion of the
proposed bargaining unit. J In 1984, a mandatory election
system was introduced, where a secret-ballot vote was
required if the minimum threshold was signed up. The
election system was then repealed in 1993 and replaced
with the original card-check procedure. Moreover, by
exploiting the timing of various legislative changes that
occurred over the sample period, the effect of mandatory
voting can be isolated from other legislative changes. 2
The paper then examines the role of management
opposition across the two different union recognition
procedures. 3
In general, mandatory election laws are believed to
lead to lower certification success rates for two reasons:
1) management has more opportunity to oppose the bid
in a voting system, and 2) peer pressure from pro-union
colleagues and union organizers may artificially inflate
the "true" level of support in a card-check system. With
respect to management opposition, a change in the union
recognition law may have two effects: 1) the effectiveness
of management opposition may change, and 2) the
incidence of management opposition may change. 4
Figure 1 shows success rates for the private and
public sectors, with withdrawn certifications and raids
excluded. The pattern in Figure 1 is striking. Success
rates for private sector organizing drives fell by nearly 20
percentage points following the introduction of mandatory
elections in May of 1984. Moreover, in 1993, success
rates appear to have recovered to their pre-voting levels,
and remained as such through the remainder of the sample
period. Interestingly, public sector success rates did not
systematically decline.
Econometric analysis that exploits the timing of
various changes in legislation suggests that mandatory
elections alone can account for the entire decline in
private sector success rates. The other major issue
addressed in the paper is the role of management
opposition. I estimate the impact of unfair labor practices 5
on certification success over the 1987-1998 period, which
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covers one card-check regime and one mandatory election
regime. In addition, I use a decomposition procedure to
provide some evidence as to how much of the decline in
success rates associated with the voting regime can be
attributed to a change in the incidence of management
opposition, and how much can be attributed to a change in
the effectiveness of management opposition. Overall, the
central results are as follows: 1) management opposition
is at least twice as effective under an election system,
2) there is no difference in the incidence of management
opposition across the different union recognition regimes,
and 3) management opposition can account for 25 percent
of the decline in success rates.

Chapter 2: Welfare Checks, Drug Consumption,
and Health
The second chapter examines the impact of the
dis11'ibution of welfare checks on the distribution of drug
consumption. The relationship between social assistance
and substance abuse has been a topic of much debate in
the United States, where, in 1996, Public Law 104-121
telminated Supplemental Security Income and Social
Security Disability Income (SSIIDI) for recipients with
a primary diagnosis related to substance abuse. The
rationale for the law was a belief that such recipients
were spending the money on drugs and alcohol such that
welfare was effectively "aiding and abetting addiction"
(Cohen 1994). Canadian law rarely makes special
provisions for substance abuse. 6
A few studies in the public health literature have
shown evidence of so-called "check effects"; that is, a
relationship between the day welfare checks are released
and subsequent increases in outcomes such as hospital
admissions, drug-related fatalities, and 911 calls. In
addition, economists have examined the relationship
between identifiable, preannounced income changes
and consumption. One such study directly tests for
a consumption-related check effect among welfare
recipients and finds that the probability and amount of
Figure 1 Certification Success Rates, British Columbia 1978-1998
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daily expenditures increases markedly on the day of check
arrival (Stephens 2003).
This paper contributes to the check-effect literature by
conducting a unique test using hospital admissions data
on injection drug users ("IDU") from the Canadian city of
Vancouver. 7 The paper addresses the question of whether
drug users are more likely to leave the hospital against
medical advice ("AMA")-thereby intenupting their
treatment-on the day that welfare checks are released.
Check day is linked to drug consumption by examining
drug overdose admissions. In particular, I test whether
check day is an environmental cue that triggers drug
use by using "Welfare Wednesday" as an instrument to
estimate the Local Average Treatment Effect of leaving
AMA on subsequent readmission and the likelihood of a
subsequent drug overdose. 8
From a theoretical perspective, the possible
relationship between welfare checks and drug
consumption has various components. One component is
the pure income effect story. Based on Cohen (1994), it
is clear that the 1997 change in U.S. law was predicated
on the notion that terminating SSIIDI benefits may lead
to reduced drug consumption. To date, we are unaware
of any study that has convincingly examined the income
effect side of the substance use/welfare debate. Indeed,
we are unable to directly test for income effects in this
paper since we do not observe an individual's benefit
level. In this paper we address the question of whether the
distribution of welfare payments affects the distribution
of drug consumption over time. Based on the addiction
literature there are two key reasons why we anticipate
a spike in drug consumption-or "bingeing"-in the
days following welfare day: 1) the neurophysiology
of intravenous cocaine use and, to a lesser extent,
intravenous heroin use 9; and 2) environmental cues. IO
Figure 2 shows the distribution of discharges (AMA
discharges relative to planned discharges, which together
equal total discharges) over the sample period. A clear
Figure 2 Distribution of Discharges, FY1996-2000
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spike is observed on the day welfare checks are released.
The results from econometric analysis confinn that
individuals induced to leave AMA by Welfare Wednesday
are readmitted to the hospital much sooner than other
patients, have longer subsequent stays in the hospital, and
are more likely to be readmitted with a drug overdose.

Chapter 3: The Long-Run Effects of Income
Support: Unemployment Insurance in Maine and
New Brunswick, 1940-1991
The final chapter examines the long-run impact of
unemployment insurance. Existing studies of the labor
market effects of income support programs focus mainly
on short-term responses to policy changes. 11 Some critics
have argued that such studies may dramatically understate
the long-telm effects of these programs. Over a longer
time horizon, individuals have the ability to make larger
adjustments in their behavior, and to adjust on a wider
number of margins, in some cases effectively building a
"lifestyle" around the programs in question.
This paper attempts to measure the long-tenn effects
of large-scale changes in income support policy by
taking advantage of a dramatic natural experiment. This
experiment results from the fact that a national borderbetween New Brunswick and Maine-divides a region
with a relatively homogenous population and resource
endowment, but which experienced dramatically different
changes in income support policy.12 By 1940, Maine had
a modest unemployment insurance (UI) system, but New
Brunswick had none. In 1950, the two systems were velY
similar. After that, New Brunswick's system grew much
more rapidly, to the point where New Bnmswick's system
in 1980-1990 was astonishingly generous to workers
with very short work histories. Using the five decennial
censuses spanning the period 1940-1991, the paper
exploits the comparison between these two jurisdictions
over time to estimate the long-telm effects ofUI program
parameters on labor market outcomes. 13
Up to 1954, the two regions were quite similar with
respect to UI policies. For example, UI constituted
around 10-12 percent of all transfers. This ratio remains
relatively constant in Maine until about 1962, after which
UI falls to between 3 and 10 percent of all transfers for
the remainder of the period under study. The trends in
New Brunswick could not be more different: the generous
1955 UIAct increased the relative importance of the VI
program to more than 25 percent of all transfers in New
Brunswick by 1958. Efforts to reduce UI transfers via
repeat user rules l4 in the early 1960s lowered this ratio to
levels similar to Maine through the late 1960s and early
1970s, but the extremely generous 1971 UI Act raised
the ratio to more than 25 percent from the mid-1970s to
1991. Indeed, by the end of the sample period, UI in New
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Brunswick accounted for nearly 6 percent of provincial
GDP. Furthermore, by 1980-1990, an individual working
15 weeks every year could collect nearly 40 weeks of
income evelY year.
The paper's focus is on the incidence of part-year
work among workers and has two main components.
The first component uses grouped cell-level census data
for the entire 1940-1991 period. A unit of observation
here is an industry-gender-region-year cell; for each such
cell we calculate the fraction of persons working part
year (defined here as less than 40 weeks), and analyze
its responsiveness to the relative income of part- versus
full-year workers in that cell, as determined by prevailing
wage rates and VI program rules. The second component
estimates the entire distribution of annual work weeks
using census micro-data from the three decades, 19701991, for which it is available in both regions.
The data indicate that men in Maine and New
Brunswick had a similar, high incidence of part-year
work in 1940. However, while men's part-year work
significantly declined over the next five decades in
Maine, it did not in New Brunswick. Among women,
part-year work was substantially less common in New
Brunswick than Maine in 1940; by 1990 this pattern had
been dramatically reversed as a result of growth in New
Brunswick and decline in Maine.
Both the cell-level and individual-level empirical
analyses generate estimates of VI program effects that
are lasting and large. For example, by 1990, 6.1 percent
of employed men in Maine worked fewer than 27 hours
per week; in New Brunswick that figure was 20.8 percent.
According to the estimates, New Brunswick's much more
generous UI system accounts for about two thirds of this
differential. Among working women, 13.8 percent worked
less than halfthe year in Maine compared to 26.2 percent
in New Brunswick, with VI policy differences accounting
for essentially all of the difference.
Overall, the results suggest that the large expansion in
income support inherent in the Canadian system over the
latter half of the twentieth century may have preserved a
"way of life" among men that has become largely extinct
in Maine. For women, Canadian VI appears to have
created a new pattern of part-year labor force participation
that would not have otherwise existed.
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Notes
1.

The proportion required to avoid an election varies by
province but generally has ranged between 50 percent and
55 percent. While it is possible for a certification bid to
require a vote in a card-check province, the reality is that
few organizing drives go to an election. Hist0l1cally, all
Canadian provinces, except Nova Scotia since 1977, have
had "card-check" procedures, but this has changed with an
increasing number of provinces going the election route
over the past decade. In addition, over the 1984-1998
period, union density fell by about 7 percentage points
in Canada-similar to the 8-percentage-point decline in
the United States during the same years. Many observers
believe that the recent decline of both unions and the cardcheck system is no coincidence.
2. Three legislative changes were made to the British
Columbia Labour Code over the sample period of October
1978- May 1998. The first, when mandatOlY elections were
introduced, was in 1984. Unlike many legislative packages
passed in Canada that included mandatory elections, the
1984 amendment made very few changes to the labour
code. Second, in 1987, sweeping changes were made to
the code when the Industrial Relations Reform Act was
introduced. Finally, in 1993, mandatory elections were
repealed. However, many ofthe "voting era" amendments
were maintained.
3. The only previous paper that has isolated the effect of
mandatory elections is Johnson (2002), who finds that
elections reduce certification success by 9 percentage
points. For the United States, Eaton and Kriesky (2001) find
some evidence that success rates are higher in cases decided
by card-check relative to elections
4. A voting regime may increase the effectiveness of
employer tactics for two reasons: 1) the amount of time
that employers have to influence the organizing drive
is unambiguously greater in the voting system (indeed,
under card-check law many organizing drives are virtually
complete before the employer is aware of the drive);
and 2) management opposition is likely to be more effective
in a voting regime because of the secret ballot vote itself.
For instance, under card-checks, if the employer coerces
employees into refhsing to sign cards, union organizers and
proIDlion colleagues can counteract the coercion tactics. In
a secret ballot vote, the opportunity to counteract employer
threats is likely diminished.

3

5. Another issue is the potential endogeneity ofULPs (i.e.,
if the employer believes success is contestable and can
be influenced, they are more likely to pursue an antiunion
campaign compared to situations where success is very
likely or very unlikely). Instmmental variable regressions
are estimated to account for this potential endogeneity.
Overall, the findings are similar. The results imply that
standard ULP estimates are biased toward zero.
6. Income assistance laws are under provincial jurisdiction
in Canada. Our reading of the provincial laws for the five
largest provinces is that only Ontario (in a legislative
change made in 1997) has a strong restriction on collecting
disability support if dependent on (or addicted to) alcohol
or dmgs (see subsections 2 and 3 of section 5, part 1 of the
Ontario Disability Support Program Act). However, the
Ontario law is not as restrictive as the U.S. law, because an
individual with an addiction can remain eligible for benefits
if they have a "substantial physical or mental impairment"
(see subsection 3), which would generally include HIV/
AIDS and various psychiatric conditions, both of which are
common among the injection dmg users in our data.
7. The dmg use situation in Vancouver is dire. In 1993
dmg overdoses from heroin became the leading cause
of death among men 30~9 years of age. Through the
1990s, Vancouver has consistently had the highest overall
levels of overdose deaths in Canada, with more than 300
in 1998 alone and more than 2000 between 1991 and
1998. According to a statement by the British Columbia
General Coroner, Vancouver's overdose death rate is "velY
likely" the highest in North America. The incidence rate
of HIV infection among Vancouver's injection dmg users
is conservatively estimated to be 25 percent, with some
articles in the media quoting a rate as high as 50 percent.
Even with the conservative estimates, Vancouver is widely
believed to have one of the highest levels of HI V infection
among injection dmg users in North America, and similar to
cities such as New York and Bangkok.
8. Welfare checks are distributed once a month in the province
of British Columbia, usually on the last Wednesday.
9. The more rapid a dmg's onset of action, the greater the
euphoria users experience and the more they "like" the
dmg. Cocaine and heroine-particularly when used
intravenously-are especially rapid in their delivety to
the brain. Moreover, in the case of cocaine, the rate of
removal from the brain is extremely fast. This is believed
to be a key reason why individuals who become addicted
to cocaine tend to move toward a "binge and crash" pattern
of use, in addition to moving from intranasal and smoking
administration toward intravenous use.
10. Research in both the psychology and neuroscience
fields has found that consumption-pat1icularly dmg
consumption-may be linked to cel1ain environmental
cues (see Laibson [2001] for a review of these literatures).
This notion implies that once a culture of dmg use has
been established-such as in the Downtown Eastside of
Vancouver-it would be very difficult for a user to resist
dmg use once exposed to that culture, even iftheir intention
was not to use dmgs. Indeed, Welfare Wednesday itself may
have become an environmental cue.
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11. Of course, for a variety of reasons, the long-term effects of
income support programs are much harder to measure than
short-term effects. One reason is that large-scale changes in
such programs tend only to be made at the national level.
As a result, a "control group" is typically not available
to indicate what might have happened in the absence of
a policy change. Identification of long-term effects in
nonexperimental studies is further hampered by the greater
leeway for confotmding variables such as macroeconomic
conditions to change over longer periods; problems that
can be avoided in sh011-tetlli studies using, for example,
a regression-discontinuity design. Experimental studies,
which solve the control group problem via random
assignment, tend to be very limited in duration and to focus
on small variations in program parameters.
12. Maine is the northeastern most state in the United States,
Imown for its fishing industry, coastal scenery, cold climate,
mral character, and relatively low incomes. New Bmnswick
is the Canadian province that borders directly on Maine,
lmown for similar traits. Both regions have populations
that are ovelwhelmingly white and native-born. Growth in
population and real income per capita were ahnost identical
in both regions, well behind their respective country
averages. Much of the paper uses the northern counties of
Maine as the comparison group-the northern counties are
where much of the primary sector is and overall industry
mix and education levels are more comparable to New
Bmnswick.
13. One paper that examines long-term effects of income
assistance is from Meyer and Rosenbaum (2001), who
study the longer-run effects of reforms to the welfare
system and the earned income tax credit, using women
without children as a control group for those much more
affected by these policy changes-women with children. A
necessaty feature of studies like Meyer and Rosenbaum's
is the use of a control group that is drawn from the same
economy as the "treatment" group. As a result, their
estimates may be contaminated by general equilibrium
effects of policy changes. FUl1her, the control group, of
necessity, is demographically different from the treatment
group (e.g., childless women versus mothers), and it is not
clear that the maintained assumption of identical policy
effects on both groups is plausible. The prospect of using
the same demographic groups in similar neighboring
regional economies over long periods of time, and in the
presence of large differential changes in income support
programs, may provide an important new perspective in
estimating the effects of social policy changes.
14. Interestingly, Maine is the only state to have a repeatuser rule, and is only one of four states to have specific
"seasonal worker" regulations.
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